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Medical devices are essential for modern medicine because they can help
automate many patient monitoring and management functions. Such devices can
be stand-alone or interoperable. Stand-alone devices, by far the most common
type, perform monitoring and treatment with- out directly interacting with other
medical devices or equipment.1 Recently, however, many medical devices have
been augmenting their stand-alone operation with considerable communication
capabilities, allowing them to interact with other devices. This interoperability
offers numerous advantages, including increased safety, usability, and decision
support, and a decrease in false alarms and clinicians’ cognitive workload.1
Until now, interoperability has been the domain of large device and systems
manufacturers, who require all-or-nothing adoption. That is, all devices must be
from the same manufacturer or individually vetted partners. This single- integrator
situation is considered safe, owing to these manufacturers’ extensive control over
interoperating devices, but this solution doesn’t scale. Overcoming this problem
requires enabling inter- operability between different manufacturers’ devices but
sacrifices control, and has negative economic consequences for traditional device
manufacturers. Furthermore, if a failure occurs, the root causes become difficult to
trace, which can be problematic for clinical facilities and regulating agencies.
Given the diversity of medical devices that might need to be interconnected, and
the structure of economic incentives, the wait for manufacturers to organically
evolve interoperability for their devices has already been long. Moreover,
regulatory agencies such as the US Food and Drug Administration don’t have the
mandate to require interoperability. Fortunately, the various stakeholders

(manufacturers, clinical facilities, regulating agencies, and so on) are recognizing
that the future lies in building genuine interoperability. Consequently, various
groups are proactively developing standards that will let devices talk to one
another.2–5
Interoperable medical devices (IMDs) face several threats due to the increased
attack surface presented by interoperability and the corresponding infrastructure.
Introducing networking and coordination functionalities fundamentally alters
medical systems’ security properties. Understanding the threats is an important
first step in eventually designing security solutions for such systems. Here, in the
first part of a two-part article, we provide an overview of the IMD environment
and the attacks that can be mounted on it.
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IMD Security
One of the most important issues with such systems of systems is ensuring patient
safety, which depends at least partially on the security guarantees offered by the
IMDs and connecting infrastructure. If an attacker can force an entity in the IMD
environment to deviate from correct behavior, the environment can no longer be
considered safe. Furthermore, a com- promised device can cause another,
otherwise functional, device to per- form dangerous tasks. In potentially
adversarial situations, such safety concerns are only exacerbated by inter device
communication that allows remote access of the entities.
Security is therefore a key requirement for IMDs for two reasons:
■ They might be deployed in life- critical settings; that is, they might administer
treatment, causing changes to the patient’s body, potentially as a result of external
directives.
■ They have access to sensitive health information.
Security attacks on medical devices have thus far been relatively rare, but as IMDs
become common, incentives increase to attack them for profit. Moreover, owing
partly to laws such as the US Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA), maintaining security and privacy of patient information is a legal
necessity. Recent years have brought increased attention to security vulnerabilities
in stand- alone medical devices.6 Introduction of interoperability makes devices
increasingly connected to and dependent on each other. Because of this increased
complexity, the connected devices will likely offer more attack avenues. An
adversary needs only to take over the weakest device in the IMD environment to
gain a foot- hold. He or she can then reach other devices through the existing trust
relationships in the environment.

An Attack Model
Adversaries targeting IMDs come in two basic types. Passive attackers can
eavesdrop on traffic between IMDs and the coordinator. Active attackers can also
alter messages, inject traffic, replay old messages, spoof, and ultimately
compromise the IMDs’ integrity.
Similarly to Zinaida Benenson and her colleagues,7 we designate five classes of
attacks on IMD environments: destroy, disturb, reprogram, denial of service, and
eavesdrop. All are active attacks except for eavesdrop. Table 1 illustrates the
environment’s susceptibility to these attacks.
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can cause various types of failures in IMD environments, and these failures’
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way to assess attacks’ potential damage. Finally, we’ll conclude with the lessons
learned from performing this attack analysis.
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